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THEORY IN PRACTICE IN A GLOBAL AGE: WHAT
LEGAL THEORY CAN AND CANNOT DO
-TIM MURPHY*
This comment focuses on the strengths and limitations of legal theory
in relation to the development of legal scholarship more generally.
It draws principally on the U.K. experience. It challenges the cult of
pure theory and argues that a much broader, historically aware,
perspective is required if we are to make sense of keywords or
phrases like rule of law, democracy and justice.

Introduction: Theory in Practice
In the sections which follow I ask: Do we live in a global age? Whose legal
theory is it, then? What legal theory should we use? What are the challenges of the
new and not so new? In the conclusion I will address some brief remarks to the
vexed West/non-West issue.

1.

A global age?

How global are we? Avian flu and all the risks and dangers which may be
associated with it are one example of globalization. However, it is partly global
because of the migration of birds, and there is nothing new about that though
there may be variations in their precise patterns over time. Human migration
and moving about  business meetings, academic conferences, tourism  is
perhaps new or at least accelerated; but the traders from Fujian and Hong Kong
and the European merchants who sailed around the world in the 16th and 17th
centuries already prefigured this kind of activity. Without this activity, Adam
Smith could not have written as intelligently as he did about eighteenth-century
China, although this came to be forgotten as China declined in the nineteenthcentury through overpopulation, imperialist predations, and natural disasters.
On the other hand we have the Internet, which seems to embody
globalism. And yet international conferences are convened with some frequency
to discuss the future regulation of the Internet and the prophets of doom are
saying they will fail because of conflicting national interests and preoccupations.
* Professor of Law, London School of Economics.
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Scholars are divided on both the novelty and sustainability of the global.
On the one hand we have new and busy international institutions  the U.N. but
also W.T.O., U.N.E.S.C.O., etc.  but on the other, there is the difficult, tensional
and unequal way in which these organizations work.
Some wish to draw our attention to global civil society, in contrast or
opposition to these inter-state arrangements. Opposition is always a good way to
bring people together, and the Internet, if it survives, facilitates this process.
Sign up to say No! is the message. This is what Habermas regards as the public
sphere and what many others label as new social movements.
I am sceptical about some of these analyses. My impression is more nuanced.
We are not even at the point where we can take a universal language  English 
for granted. In my limited experience, communication remains difficult. World
society, a Luhmannian concept, which I think makes sense, works best at the
level of the global interdependence of economies. It is also here where the
structural inequalities show up most sharply. At a cultural level things are much
more complex. It is clear that at one level globalization is at work: the celebrity of
David Beckham, the wearing of England t-shirts, sport on the television and so
on.
It may be that younger people will grow up thinking of themselves as citizens
of some kind of world society. But I rather doubt it. People may wear the same
clothes and use the same phones (and engage in the same games of emulation
attached to these items of display) but what happens in the kitchen or bathroom
or bedroom will remain rather more local matters rooted for the most part in
traditional practices (although for some, the Internet no doubt opens up another
world which can be absorbed into a refashioning of what is traditional or on the
other hand reinforce resistance to Western decadence). The one significant
global trend, which is of interest at this level is the position of women in society.
I do not know if this is emulation, contagion, or something else.

2.

Whose legal theory?

The main sources of legal theory in English-language or more broadly
European-language publications are the U.S., the U.K., Germany and France. But
what is the relevance of this for R.O.K., for China, for India, for Viet Nam?
Emulation? In what is supposed to be a global age, ministries and
departments of government may seek and often do to emulate what is perceived
to be Western rhetoric and perhaps even their ways of doing business. Whether
their societies see matters in the same way is another question. This does not
2
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make Western legal theory worthless for scholars and students in the developing
world. It does mean that its relevance should be viewed with some suspicion.
Theory is rooted in practical contexts, in traditions, in culture, in ways of teaching,
acting, thinking. These can be transported to some extent  the enduring (but
diminishing) British influence in India provides an example. But in general terms
it can be said that transplantation of theories runs the risk of a false abstraction
and empty rhetoric, which results precisely from the fact or act of transplantation.

3.

What legal theory?

What is the purpose of legal theory in practice? It is decorative in scholarly
publications but more importantly it helps to make the study of law more fruitful,
interesting and meaningful.1 Doctrinal analysis, unavoidable in the law school, is
limited intellectually, although no doubt the nature of these limitations differs
between common law and civil law systems. (At the same time, current trends, if
they continue, mean that global law firms will dominate the legal scene and this
means that the modus operandi of commercial law will owe more and more to the
common law tradition.)
Which theories are important for this purpose? If asked this question in the
U.K. around thirty years ago, the answer would have been fairly simple  Herbert
Hart and Ronald Dworkin. A few years later, the answer would have been more
polarized  Critical Legal Studies and/or Marxism would have been on the list. By
the early eighties, other approaches had entered the fray  Niklas Luhmann,
Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas especially.
Hart developed an elegant analysis of the orientation of the U.K. judiciary
towards legality and validity. It convincingly explained how, despite no written
constitution and with the perhaps paradoxical combination of an independent
but subordinate judiciary, the rule of law existed and made sense in the U.K. It
was, arguably, rather parochial  not legal theory for a global age. The basic
anthropological ignorance of The Concept of Law also exposed it to wider
academic criticism. British traditions have, of course, as a result of Empire, been
exported around many parts of the world, and many of the judges in these
countries have been educated in the U.K. Many of these judges and lawyers took
or take the view that British thinking was of limited use in their local conditions
and it is not my intention to argue that they were or are wrong.2
1

I have discussed some of what follows elsewhere: see my Postmodernism: Legal Theory,
Legal Education and the Future, 7 INTL. J. LEGAL PROFESSIONS 357-379 (2000).

2

It may be interesting to compare Malaysia, Singapore, India in this respect.
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Dworkin burst on the scene like a colossus but with a simple argument 
that judges apply or should apply principles in their decisions or at least in the
hard ones and that Harts view of the self-generated subservience of judges was
wrong. This was, as was widely recognized at the time, an American perspective.
At the same time, as Dworkins work developed and expanded, it was clear that he
had spawned a rhetoric which was serviceable for scholars and for judges of a
liberal persuasion. The distinction between principle and policy gave this
enterprise much leverage. This became a kind of common sense (what Bourdieu
calls docta ignorantia) in U.K. law schools. We can probably see this mode of
thought reflected in the process which led to the enactment of the Human Rights
Act, 1998 in the U.K., in which many critical decisions  e.g. striking a balance
between freedom of expression and the right to privacy  were effectively deferred
to the judiciary. But it was never clear whether Dworkins project was a description
of what happens or a prescription about what should. And, operationally, it seems
clear that sections of the U.K. government now regret this.
Given conditions in the U.K. in the 1970s and early eighties, the atmosphere
was ripe for more radical approaches. There was an appetite for theory as
critique rather than theory serving as a justification of the establishment.
Looking back, I think the main works of both Hart and Dworkin were critical, but
that is not how it seemed at the time. So progressive scholars drifted towards
either critical legal studies or Marxism or both. Duncan Kennedy or Paul Hirst or
Rick Abel became sought-after key players at conferences. The task of legal theory
became to participate in the critique of capitalism and specifically in the role
played by law in its reproduction. The Americans tended to focus more upon
judicial bias and the way in which decisions were pre-structured; the Brits tended
towards more structural analyses with fewer practical implications. Although
nothing about any of this was pro-Soviet, the collapse of the USSR and of Sovietdominated Eastern Europe eroded these positions and played a significant role in
facilitating its implosion.
C.L.S. remains in place in a general sense although in circumstances which
are radically changed, both in the U.S.A. and globally. Marxist scholarship in the
U.K. is probably now just a memory.3
Given the perception  not universally held of course  of the moribund
nature of Hart, the over-idealistic vision of Dworkin, and the rather passé nature
of C.L.S. and the bankruptcy of Marxism, many turned to European theory. Here,
however, one did not primarily encounter legal theory but a critical social theory.
3

On all of this, see generally, my BritCrits: Subversion and Submission Past Present and
Future, 10 LAW & CRIT. 237-278 (1999).
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I think this was important in that this encouraged legal scholars to broaden their
horizons. The principal scholars I have in mind are, as indicated already, Niklas
Luhmann, Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas. Of these three, Habermas, in
many respects, was the least challenging and his major book on law, Between
Facts and Norms  the English translation title, is disappointingly based on an
engagement with the like of Dworkin and other legal philosophers. As a teacher, I
find some of his earlier work much richer for students, not least because it offers
more opportunities for use in relation to some topic or area of contemporary law
 or legal history for that matter.4
Habermas has unfolded a vision of a public sphere which grew and then
declined in countries like the U.K. due to a retreat into what he once termed civic
privatism. I struggle to see how this is a useful theoretical framework for other
countries, rooted as it is in a rather specific part-European history. The closely
linked idea of a public sphere, either as an objective or actuality, which was
very popular in the 80s among intellectuals in China for example,5 seems to be
largely inappropriate to transport around the world.
To move on: Foucault and Luhmann, in their very different ways, were
geniuses  magistri ludi (masters of the game). Foucaults work inevitably looms
large in any projects to do with criminal justice, social work, even human rights.
He may or may not have been right but his legacy is impossible to avoid. There
were, however, many confusions about the meaning of his work  was it Marxism
by other means, was it a call for emancipation, and if the latter what could that
mean given his own positions? All I can say is that anyone working in the areas of
criminal responsibility or of sexuality ignores Foucaults playful genius at their
peril. And at a more general level, Foucault challenged us to think about what law
is really about, and therefore what legal theory should focus upon. Put differently,
his example invited scholars to look at a broader range of sources and materials
than had been traditional  to look at newspaper articles, journals, archives etc.
You did not have to be a proper legal historian any more if you followed his
example.
Particularly important was a distinction he formulated, with a typical
combination of clarity and obscurity, between law and norm. Law, Thou shalt
not, belongs to an old order;6 norms, this is the way to go or the target to aim
4

See e.g. HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY (1990).

5

See e.g. THE ESSAYS IN XUDONG ZHANG, WHITHER CHINA? INTELLECTUAL POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY
CHINA (2001).

6

As I try to indicate in my THE OLDEST SOCIAL SCIENCE? CONFIGURATIONS OF LAW AND MODERNITY
(1997).
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at, represent the style of our current age.7 The techniques of the two regimes are
different, as are the consequences of failure. The raucous rhetoric of the rule of
law should not blind us to this difference and to the significance of this
transformation. Of course the two domains overlap and criss-cross. Norms turn
into prohibitions  smoking is a current example.
I leave Niklas Luhmann until now in this section. He was the true genius. It
is difficult to comment with any precision on his influence: his writing was so
dense and difficult that many misunderstood him or took from him just what they
wanted to suit their own agenda, and once again, so far as law is concerned,
Luhmann did not set himself up as a legal theorist. But like Foucault, he helped
legal scholars to explore issues (empirical and theoretical) which went beyond
their normal domain. Issues or themes which had not been relevant became
relevant. For example, any discussion of risk or the environment is deficient
unless it takes account of Luhmanns theoretical work on these issues.8 This is
what theory in practice should do: enable us to think intelligently about important,
practical issues, which we confront today.
This does not mean that Luhmann offers a number of benign prescriptions
about how we can make the world a better place. The word/phrase democracy/
rule of law can be used too often and too easily. At the centre of law as a social
system, for Luhmann, are processes of adjudication and the techniques and
mechanisms associated with that cluster of activities.9 On the periphery of law
understood in these terms are, to simplify, legislation and contracts, as generic
labels to encompass a cluster of other legal processes. Here, legislation
encompasses all those processes now commonly described as regulation; contract,
similarly, captures all those legal techniques of private ordering, including wills,
trusts, leases and so on. (Or at least this is my reading of what Luhmann has in
mind.) The central position accorded here, to adjudication, does not imply a
comment on the social importance of this activity and, as should be clear, questions
of the effects or impact of law-as-adjudication upon society (the classical
sociology of law question) are largely beside the point. Luhmann offers a
framework within which we can ask, rather, in what respects. lawyers make law
and law makes lawyers; how society uses law and how law uses society; and what
aspects of these operations are or are not European anomalies. These are better
questions than those we have been accustomed to ask in Western scholarship or
than many (though not all) of those, which are acquiring a new canonical status

7

See especially FOUCAULT, HISTORY
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under the capacious rubric of critical legal studies. Luhmann may have lacked
the ambition or desire or faith or vision to make either people or the world better.
But he did offer a programme of societal self-awareness, which may, in its way, be
something more valuable.
Some commentators question the degree to which, because the projects of
Habermas and Rawls remain committed to an Enlightenment faith in reason which
Luhmann dismissed as old-European (long before Rumsfeld and with quite
different intentions), they remain, despite their protestations to the contrary,
much more metaphysical than Luhmann, who is the true postmetaphysician. But
the same or a related metaphysics is in play when it comes to the question of
agency. The stake is so often presented as one in which the fate of the human will
be decided. Without the belief (for that is what it is and that is what is
metaphysical) in agency, we cannot make history (i.e. change the world). But, for
Luhmann, observers need to be aware of their position/s and of their limitations.
Even precautionary principles mask rather than help decision-making in this
situation. The world will do what it does. It is not a question of freedom and
determinism but of contingency. This is why Luhmanns is a dismal science. But
that does not make it wrong. Scholars are not  or should not be  cheerleaders.
We need to know what we do not know.10

4.

The challenges of the new and not so new

Here I would single out Islam, Confucianism (because suddenly we are all
aware of China) and postcolonial studies (e.g. the subaltern studies literature
which has emerged from India in particular). I do not see how Western scholars
working in the area of theory can ignore these developments. The global age,
whether or not it is new, means that the West has to engage with other traditions
because their own populations are multicultural and now has to debate what
this might mean and what its implications might be.11
What I mean, precisely, is that we in the West cannot assume that our models
or paradigms are sustainable, even in our own countries. I have some
understanding of the situation in those countries outside this cultural universe,
which have sought to move closer to these models or implement them. I also
understand the defensiveness in Hong Kong for example that under the One

10

See also, Luhmann, The Ecology of Ignorance in OBSERVATIONS
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I argued this some years ago before the world changed in my Postmodernism: Legal
Theory, Legal Education and the Future, 7 INTL. J. LEGAL PROFESSIONS 357-379 (2000).
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Country, Two Systems theory they will continue to teach Hart and Dworkin. To
me, this is slightly bizarre. But it is not for me to say.

5.

Conclusion

I do not believe that a particular people should remain rooted in their
supposed traditions for the sake of it. My personal viewpoint is simple enough:
people should be free to do what they want to do so long as it doesnt harm others.
But we cannot easily take culture, history, tradition or religious belief out of people
as if all that remains is people purified of all the determinants that give them their
identity. And the law cannot change this.
A final point is about the West and the non-West. I do not for a minute
suggest that this is a useful distinction. The West is as divergent and diverse as
the different countries in South, East, and South-East Asia I have visited. There
are some things in common and many things which are not. It is easy for academics
flying around the world to seminars or reading each others work on the internet
to forget that this is a global community in only a very limited sense. Conferences
do not equal globalization.
There is nothing new about the appetite to absorb Western scholarship in
the East. Japan is the most obvious case, and many Chinese went there to study
and absorbed what they were offered there. But this is not an East-West thing: it is
more like the risks of Avian flu  something in the air, floating about
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